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Abstract
This paper investigates the detection of communication outbreaks among a small
team of actors in time-varying networks. We propose monitoring plans for known and
unknown teams based on generalizations of the exponentially weighted moving average
(EWMA) statistic. For unknown teams, we propose an efficient neighborhood-based
search to estimate a collection of candidate teams. This procedure dramatically re-
duces the computational complexity of an exhaustive search. Our procedure consists
of two steps: communication counts between actors are first smoothed using a multi-
variate EWMA strategy. Densely connected teams are identified as candidates using
a neighborhood search approach. These candidate teams are then monitored using a
surveillance plan derived from a generalized EWMA statistic. Monitoring plans are
established for collaborative teams, teams with a dominant leader, as well as for global
outbreaks. We consider weighted heterogeneous dynamic networks, where the expected
communication count between each pair of actors is potentially different across pairs
and time, as well as homogeneous networks, where the expected communication count
is constant across time and actors. Our monitoring plans are evaluated on a test bed of
simulated networks as well as on the U.S. Senate co-voting network, which models the
Senate voting patterns from 1857 to 2015. Our analysis suggests that our surveillance
strategies can efficiently detect relevant and significant changes in dynamic networks.
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1 Introduction
In many applications, it is of interest to identify anomalous behavior among the actors
in a time-varying network. For example in online social networks, sudden increased commu-
nications often signify illegal behavior such as fraud or collusion (Pandit et al., 2007; Savage
et al., 2014). Anomalous changes like these are reflected by local structural changes in the
network. The goal of network monitoring is to provide a surveillance plan that can detect
such structural changes. Network monitoring techniques have been successfully utilized in
a number of applications, including the identification of central players in terrorist groups
(Krebs, 2002; Reid et al., 2005; Porter and White, 2012), and the detection of fraud in online
networks (Chau et al., 2006; Pandit et al., 2007; Akoglu and Faloutsos, 2013). As available
data has become more complex, there has been a recent surge of interest in the development
and application of scalable network monitoring methodologies (see Savage et al. (2014) and
Woodall et al. (2016) for recent reviews).
In this paper, we investigate monitoring the interactions of a fixed collection of n actors
[n] = {1, . . . , n} over discrete times t = 1, . . . , T . In general, an interaction is broadly
defined and may represent, for example, communications in an online network (Prusiewicz,
2008), citations in a co-authorship network (Liu et al., 2005), or gene-gene interactions in a
biological network (Parker et al., 2015). We model the interactions of these actors at time
t by a n × n stochastic adjacency matrix Yt = (yi,j,t), where yi,j,t is the discrete random
variable that represents the number of interactions between actor i and actor j at time t.
Our goal is to develop a surveillance strategy to detect communication outbreaks among a
subset of actors Ωt ⊆ [n] at time t.
The identification of outbreaks among a subset of actors Ωt corresponds to detecting
sudden increases in the collection of edges {yi,j,t : i, j ∈ Ωt}. When the team is unknown,
monitoring can be computationally expensive due to the need for identifying candidate teams.
For example, consider a simple case where we know the size of the target team is nΩt = |Ωt|.
An exhaustive monitoring of all teams of size nΩt requires a procedure of complexity
(
n
nΩt
)
≈
nnΩt , which is infeasible even for moderately sized networks. As social networks are generally
large, e.g. n is on the order of 1 million for online networks like those represesenting Facebook
or Twitter, exhaustive searches are not practical in real-time. To address this challenge, we
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propose a computationally efficient local surveillance strategy that monitors the interactions
of densely connected neighborhoods through time. Our proposed strategy has computational
complexity of order n2, and provides a viable strategy for large networks.
Our surveillance procedure consists of two steps, which can be briefly described as follows.
First, we smooth the communication counts across all pairs and time using a multivariate
adaptation of the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) technique for smoothing
Poisson counts. By monitoring the smoothed counts, our strategy is robust to sudden random
oscillations in the observed count process. Next, candidate teams are identified locally
for each node using a neighborhood-based approach. In particular, at time t we define a
candidate team for node i ∈ [n] as one that contains larger than expected communication.
Surveillance plans for these candidate teams are developed using appropriate generalizations
of the multivariate EWMA statistic.
We develop surveillance plans using the above technique in general for heterogeneous
dynamic networks Y = {Y1, . . . , YT}, where we suppose that the expected communication
counts are possibly different for each pair and time, namely, E[yi,j,t] = λi,j,t. We consider
three situations describing the team Ωt:
(i) Collaborative teams: members of Ωt communicate with one another far more than they
communicate with actors outside of the team.
(ii) Dominant leader teams: the members of Ωt have a dominant leader ν who commu-
nicates frequently with members of Ωt, but the members of Ωt themselves do not
necessarily communicate frequently amongst themselves.
(iii) Global outbreaks: the entire network undergoes a communication outbreak, namely
Ωt ≡ [n].
Scenarios (i) and (ii) are considered for both unknown and known teams. Each of the
scenarios are also considered for homogeneous networks, where E[yi,j,t] ≡ λ. By investigating
both a test bed of simulated networks as well as a real network describing the U.S. Senate
voting patterns, we find that our surveillance strategy can efficiently and reliably detect
significant changes in dynamic networks.
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1.1 Related Work
The most closely related work to our current manuscript is that introduced in Heard
et al. (2010). In that paper, the authors also consider monitoring changes in communication
volume between subgroups of targeted people over time. Their approach evaluates pairwise
communication counts and determines whether these have significantly increased using a p-
value, which assesses the deviation of the communication rate at time t and what is considered
normal behavior. Here, normal behavior is modeled using conjugate Bayesian models for the
discrete-valued time series of communications up to time t. While their focus is detecting
changes on the entire network, our approach considers detecting communication outbreaks
for members of a small team within the dynamic network.
There are other model-based network monitoring approaches that have been recently
developed, which we briefly describe here. Azarnoush et al. (2016) proposed a longitudinal
logistic model that describes the (binary) occurence of an edge at time t as a function of
time-varying edge attributes in the sequence of networks G([n], T ). Likelihood ratio tests of
the fitted model are used to identify significant changes inG([n], T ). Peel and Clauset (2014)
developed a generalized hierarchical random graph model (GHRG) to model G([n], T ). To
detect anomalies, the authors used the GHRG as a null model to compare observed graphs
in G([n], T ) via a Bayes factor, which is calculated using bootstrap simulation. Wilson
et al. (2016) proposed modeling and estimating change in a sequence of networks using
the dynamic degree-corrected stochastic block model (DCSBM). In that work, maximum
likelihood estimates of the DCSBM are used for monitoring via Shewhart control charts.
Our model is similar to the DCSBM in that edges are modeled as having discrete-valued
edge-weights, which flexibly model communications in social networks.
The EWMA control chart is a popular univariate monitoring technique. The multivariate
EWMA process that we use here is a generalization of the univariate EWMA strategies for
Poisson counts considered in Weiß (2007, 2009), Sparks et al. (2009, 2010), and Zhou et al.
(2012). A related multivariate EWMA control chart has previously been successfully applied
to space-time monitoring of crime (Zeng et al., 2004; Kim and O‘ Kelly, 2008; Neill, 2009;
Nakaya and Yano, 2010).
Our specified dynamic network model for Y = {Y1, . . . , YT} is related to several well-
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studied random graph models, which are ubiquitous in social network analysis. For example,
when yi,j,t are independent and identically distributed Poisson(λ) random variables, the
graph at time t is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model with edge connection probability
λ (Erdo¨s and Re´nyi, 1960). On the other hand, when yi,j,t are independent Poisson(λi,j,t)
random variables, graph t is a weighted variant of the Chung-Lu random graph model (Aiello
et al., 2000). Random graph models play an important role in the statistical analysis of
relational data. Goldenberg et al. (2010) provides a recent survey about random graph
models and their applications.
1.2 Organization of this Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how
to smooth the observed communication counts using multivariate EWMA smoothing. In
Section 3 we develop surveillance strategies for communication outbreaks among small teams
of actors in a dynamic network when the target team is known. We consider collaborative
teams, dominant leader teams, as well as global outbreaks. Section 4 describes our proposed
local search and monitoring approach for unknown target teams. Section 5 investigates the
performance of our surveillance strategies on a test-bed of simulated networks. We make
recommendations on designing the plans in such a way to minimize false discovery. In
Section 6, we further assess the performance of our strategy by applying the plans to the
heterogeneous network describing the U.S. Senate voting patterns from the 35th to the 113th
Congress. We conclude with a summary of our findings and discuss directions for future work
in Section 7.
2 Temporal EWMA Smoothing of Interactions
Throughout this work, we are concerned with detecting significant increases in commu-
nication among the members of some subset of actors Ωt ⊆ [n]. Such fluctations correspond
to sudden spikes in the collection of edge weights {yi,j,t : i, j ∈ Ωt}. In many cases, the
communication counts {yi,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T} are prone to random fluctuations that
arise from noise in the observed process. If not accounted for, direct monitoring of counts
may lead to false discovery. To reduce this possibility, we smooth the observed counts using
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a reflective EWMA strategy (Gan, 1993).
To begin, we first obtain a collection of smoothed values {y˜i,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T}
using an EWMA strategy. Fix α ∈ [0, 1], and define
y˜i,j,t = α yi,j,t + (1− α) y˜i,j,t−1. (1)
Denote the expected value of y˜i,j,t by λ˜i,j,t. The expected values of these smoothed counts
can be calculated using the following recursion
λ˜i,j,t = α λi,j,t + (1− α) λ˜i,j,t−1.
In the above recursion, the initial values are set as y˜i,j,0 = λ˜i,j,0 = λi,j,1. Here, α acts
as a smoothing parameter that dictates the temporal memory retained in the stochastic
process {y˜i,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T}. Large values of α retain less memory and result in
less smoothing. In our applications, we fix α to 0.075 based on the previous analysis and
suggestion of Sparks and Patrick (2014).
Notably, the EWMA in (1) will not reflect a change in the observed count process in the
scenario that yi,j,t decreases immediately before a significant (anomalous) increase. To avoid
this worst-case scenario, we use the reflective boundary EWMA process {y∗i,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t =
1, . . . , T}, defined by
y∗i,j,t = max(α y˜i,j,t + (1− α) y∗i,j,t, λ˜i,j,t) (2)
The reflective boundary EWMA specified in (2) is robust to sudden oscillations in the
count process. Our surveillance plans will utilize the smoothed counts from (2) rather than
the originally observed counts.
3 Monitoring a Known Team of Actors
We begin by considering the simplest case when the target team Ωt is known a priori.
This scenario arises, for example, in the surveillance of the communication among a known
active group of terrorists in a large terrorist network. We develop surveillance plans for
collaborative and dominant leader teams, as well as global changes, where the entire network
6
undergoes a communication outbreak. For each of these scenarios we describe monitoring
a homogeneous sequence of networks Y , where the collection of expected communications
{λi,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T} are such that λi,j,t ≡ λ for all i, j and t, and further
describe how to extend the plans in this regime to the more general heterogeneous case,
where expected communications are possibly different accross time and actor pairs.
In both this section and Section 4, we will make use of two tunable parameters – α ∈ [0, 1]:
a smoothing parameter that controls the extent to which a proposed EWMA statistic has
temporal memory, and h(·, ·): threshold functions that are chosen to control false discovery
of the proposed monitoring plan. We fix α = 0.075 based on previous analysis conducted in
Sparks and Patrick (2014). The threshold functions h(·, ·) are chosen via simulation of the
monitored process. We describe how these are chosen in detail in the Appendix.
Throughout this and the following section, let y˜i,j,t and y∗i,j,t be the EWMA and reflective
boundary EWMA defined in (1) and (2), respectively. Further, we denote nΩt = |Ωt| as the
number of individuals in the team.
3.1 Ωt is a Collaborative Team
We first consider monitoring for outbreaks among a collaborative team Ωt, wherein all
members of Ωt are expected to communicate regularly. An outbreak in a collaborative
team is reflected by a large average number of communications between members i, j ∈ Ωt.
To detect such outbreaks, we analyze the mean, µΩt , of the smoothed interactions in the
collection defined as
µΩt = E
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
y˜i,j,t
 = ∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
λ˜i,j,t (3)
In the case that Y is homogeneous, note that µΩt = n2Ωtλ. We use a group - EWMA
(GEWMA) statistic to identify outbreaks among the actors in Ωt. The GEWMAt process is
defined by the following recursion
GEWMAt = max
α∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
y˜i,j,t + (1− α) GEWMAt−1, µΩt
 , (4)
where the initial value GEWMA1 =
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt y˜i,j,1.
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For homogeneous networks, we use the GEWMAt process from (4) and flag an outbreak
within the team Ωt when
√
GEWMAt − nΩt
√
λ > hG(λ, nΩt), (5)
where hG(nΩt , λ) is designed to give the plan a low false discovery rate. Importantly, the
square root transform of the GEWMAt process in (5) stabilizes the variance of the process
to a constant value (see Bartlett (1936)). Thus, the left hand side of (5) is no longer a
function of the mean λ. Indeed, we find from simulation that the threshold hG(nΩt , λ) is
not a function of λ; hence, even in the heterogeneous case we can use a plan with the
threshold hG(nΩt). We describe how to choose the value hG(nΩt) in the Appendix. Thus for
heterogeneous networks, we flag an outbreak in the team Ωt when
√
GEWMAt −
√∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
λ˜i,j,t > hG(nΩt). (6)
In practice, a target team Ωt may purposefully reduce their communication levels prior
to, say, planning a crime, which may hamper early detection when using the GEWMAt
statistic defined in (4). To avoid this scenario, one can alternatively use a reflective boundary
GEWMA statistic defined as
GEWMA∗t =
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
y∗i,j,t, (7)
and apply an analogous plan as defined in (6).
3.2 Ωt Has a Dominant Leader
We now consider the scenario in which the target team Ωt has a known dominant leader
ν ∈ [n]. We expect that ν will have a high level of communication with the members
of Ωt, but unlike the collaborative team setting, the members of Ωt do not neccessarily
significantly interact with one another. In this case, an outbreak is signalled when there
is either a significant rate of communications between ν and the members of Ωt, or by
a significant rate of interactions among the members of Ωt. As we primarily need to be
concerned with the communications between a single actor and a collection of actors, we
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develop a monitoring strategy that exploits sparsity in the interactions among the members
of Ωt. At time t, we monitor only the collection of actors that (a) significantly communicate
with the dominant leader ν, and (b) significantly communicate with one another. That is,
we identify the dominant leader team Ωt by following two steps. First we identify the team
Wν,t that contains all individuals in [n] with a significant number of interactions with ν,
namely
Wν,t = {i 6= ν ∈ [n] :
√
y∗ν,i,t + y∗i,ν,t −
√
λ˜ν,i,t + λ˜i,ν,t > k}. (8)
Next we refine the team Wν,t to include only those members who share a significant
number of communications. We set
Ωt = {i, j ∈ Wν,t :
√
y∗i,j,t −
√
λ˜i,j,t > k or
√
y∗j,i,t −
√
λ˜j,i,t > k}. (9)
The value k is a suitable constant that helps identify members of the target group and
is chosen to control the size of the team Ωt. We consider the choice of k in our simulation
study in Section 5. To monitor Ωt, we use the dominant leader EWMA (DEWMA) statistic,
defined as
DEWMAν,t =
∑
i∈Wν,t
(
y∗i,ν,t + y∗ν,i,t
)
+
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
y∗i,j,t. (10)
When ν is known, we can use the DEWMA statistic from (10) to flag outbreaks in a
dominant leader team. In the case that Y is homogeneous, we flag an outbreak when
√
DEWMAν,t −
√
2nWν,tλ+ n2Ωtλ > hD(nλ,Ωt , λ). (11)
Above, hD(nΩt , λ) is chosen to control false discovery. Once again simulations suggest
that the square root transformation rids the dependence of the threshold hD(nΩt , λ) on λ.
Thus, we use the following general surveillance plan for heterogeneous networks when ν is
known
√
DEWMAν,t −
√ ∑
i∈Wν,t
(
λ˜i,ν,t + λ˜ν,i,t
)
+
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
λ˜i,j,t > hD(nΩt), (12)
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We note that when the team and dominant leader are both unknown, the plan in (12) is
complicated by the fact that we must estimate ν and Ωt. We discuss our strategy to handle
this in Section 4.
3.3 Global Outbreaks
We now consider the case when there is a significant increase in the number of interactions
among every pair of actors in the network, i.e., when Ωt ≡ [n] for all t. One can generally
detect this anomaly early by monitoring the aggregated interactions over the target network.
To monitor the network for a global outbreak, one can directly extend the GEWMAt statistic
from (4) to the entire network. Note that in the case that Ωt ≡ [n], we have from (3) that
µ[n] =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n] λ˜i,j,t. Following our previous development of the GEWMAt statistic in
(4), we define the total-EWMA (TEWMA) statistic using the following recursion
TEWMAt = max
α ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
y˜i,j,t + (1− α) TEWMAt−1, µ[n]
 , (13)
where TEWMA1 =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n] y˜i,j,1, and α ∈ [0, 1] is chosen to smooth the TEWMA
process. Using the statistic in (13), we flag a global outbreak in homogeneous networks
when
√
TEWMAt − n
√
λ > hT (λ, n). (14)
The threshold hT (n, λ) designed to give the plan a low enough false discovery rate, and
is chosen in the same manner as plan (5). As before, hT (n, λ) does not depend on the
expected communication counts due to the square root transform. Hence, in general we flag
an outbreak in heterogeneous networks when
√
TEWMAt −
√∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
λ˜i,j,t > hT (n). (15)
To avoid issues arising from sudden oscillations in counts, we can instead use the reflected-
boundary TEWMA statistic
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TEWMA∗t =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
y∗i,j,t, (16)
and apply the plan given in (15).
4 Monitoring of an Unknown Team of Actors
In many applications, Ωt is not known a priori. In this situation, there are two primary
difficulties that one must address. First, the unknown team must be efficiently estimated.
An exhaustive search for an anomalous team has complexity of order nnΩt ; thus, it is im-
portant to employ scalable approaches for estimation. When Ωt is known, the GEWMAt
and DEWMAν,t statistics are invariant to variations in the communication means. However,
when Ωt is unknown these statistics are no longer invariant to heterogeneous communication
rates through time. Thus the second complication comes in adapting the monitoring plan
for a changing mean in heterogeneous networks. In this section we describe a local search
strategy to identify densely connected teams on which our proposed statistics can be used
for monitoring. Since the global outbreak plan in (15) is invariant to mean changes, we only
need to consider the scenarios when Ωt is either a collaborative team or a dominant leader
team.
4.1 Estimating Unknown Teams
Here, we describe our local search strategy to estimate collaborative teams as well as
teams with a dominant leader.
4.1.1 Collaborative Teams
When the target team is unknown and collaborative, we propose monitoring a collection
of densely connected teams ΩC,t := {Ω̂`,t : ` ∈ [n]} at each time t. We define a candidate
team Ω̂`,t as one in which all constituent members significantly interact. In particular, for
each ` ∈ [n] and each time t, we identify the candidate team
Ω̂`,t = {i ∈ [n] :
√
y∗i,`,t −
√
λ˜i,`,t > k, or
√
y∗`,i,t −
√
λ˜`,i,t > k}. (17)
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Above, k is a suitable constant with good detection properties and is chosen via simulation.
Our specification of each candidate team Ω̂`,t is motivated by empirical properties of real
networks. One can view Ω̂`,t structurally as a hub with center node `. Hub structures
commonly arise in sparse social and biological networks as well as the well-studied scale-free
family of networks (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999; Tan et al., 2014). Thus if the unknown team
is suspected to be a collaborative team, we propose monitoring at most n densely connected
teams.
4.1.2 Dominant Leader Teams
When the dominant leader ν and target team Ωt is unknown, we monitor a collection
of candidate dominant leader teams ΩD,t := {Ω̂ν,t : ν ∈ [n]} at each time t. Like the
identification of dominant leader teams in Section 3, we identify a collection of candidate
dominant leader teams that have a significantly large rate of communication. First for a
fixed leader ν ∈ [n] we identify a team Ŵν,t by finding all individuals in [n] with a significant
number of interactions with ν given by
Ŵν,t = {i 6= ν ∈ [n] :
√
y∗ν,i,t + y∗i,ν,t −
√
λ˜ν,i,t + λ˜i,ν,t > k} (18)
We next refine the team Ŵν,t to include only those members who share a significant
number of interactions. Namely, we specify the team Ω̂ν,t as
Ω̂ν,t = {i, j ∈ Ŵν,t :
√
y∗i,j,t −
√
λ˜i,j,t > k or
√
y∗j,i,t −
√
λ˜j,i,t > k} (19)
The value k is a suitable constant that helps identify members of the target group with
larger than expected communications with the dominant leader ν. We note that rather than
a normal standardized score to identify Ωt, we use a ‘signal-to-noise’ team identification
scheme in (18) as this strategy can efficiently avoid unusual changes that involve very low
communication levels.
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4.2 Adapting the Plans for Heterogeneous Networks
Once the candidate teams ΩC,t = {Ω̂`,t : ` ∈ [n]} and ΩD,t = {Ω̂ν,t : ν ∈ [n]} have
been estimated for each time t, we can develop a monitoring plan. For `, ν ∈ [n], define the
following local GEWMA and DEWMA statistics
GEWMA∗`,t =
∑
i∈Ω̂`,t
∑
j∈Ω̂`,t
y∗i,j,t (20)
DEWMA∗ν,t =
∑
i∈Ŵν,t
(
y∗i,ν,t + y∗ν,i,t
)
+
∑
i∈Ω̂ν,t
∑
j∈Ω̂ν,t
y∗i,j,t. (21)
When the observed network is homogeneous, one can readily monitor collaborative and
dominant leader teams by using plans (6) and (11), respectively, for the local GEWMA and
DEWMA statistics in (20) and (21). When the network is heterogeneous, we develop an
adaptive plan for surveillance as follows. Note that for a fixed candidate collaborative team
Ω̂`,t, the plan in (6) can be re-expressed as
√
GEWMA∗`,t/h2G(λ, nΩ̂`,t)−
√√√√ ∑
i∈Ω̂`,t
∑
j∈Ω̂`,t
λi,j,t/h2G(λ, nΩ̂`,t) > 1 (22)
Importantly the threshold in plan (22) no longer depends on the observed data. We ex-
ploit this property and define an adaptive plan using the local adaptive group-EWMA
(AGEWMA) statistic:
AGEWMA`,t = GEWMA∗`,t/h2G(λ˜i,j,t, nΩ̂`,t). (23)
For an unknown team Ωt, a communication outbreak is flagged when
√
AGEWMA`,t −
√√√√ ∑
i∈Ω̂`,t
∑
j∈Ω̂`,t
λ˜i,j,t/h2G(λ˜i,j,t, nΩ̂`,t) > 1, (24)
for any ` ∈ [n]. Here, the team must be re-estimated at each time period t. This adaptive
plan in (24) has the same in-control ATS value used to design the homogeneous plans for all
λi,j,t.
We can use a similar adaptive plan to identify communication outbreaks in candidate
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dominant leader teams. Define the local adaptive dominant leader - EWMA (ADEWMA)
statistic by
ADEWMAν,t =
∑
i∈Ŵν,t
 y∗i,ν,t
hD(λ˜i,ν,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
+
y∗j,ν,t
hD(λ˜j,ν,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
+ ∑
i∈Ω̂ν,t
∑
j∈Ω̂ν,t
y∗i,j,t
hD(λ˜i,j,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
.
(25)
Using an analagous argument as above for the adaptive GEWMA plan, we flag a com-
munication outbreak among dominant leader teams when
√
ADEWMAν,t −
√√√√√ ∑
i∈Ŵν,t
 λ˜∗i,ν,t
hD(λ˜i,ν,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
+
λ˜∗j,ν,t
hD(λ˜j,ν,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
+ ∑
i∈Ω̂ν,t
∑
j∈Ω̂ν,t
λ˜∗i,j,t
hD(λ˜i,j,t, nΩ̂ν,t)
> 1 (26)
for any ν ∈ [n]. There are two distinct scenarios in which an outbreak will be flagged by the
plan (26). In the first scenario, an outbreak is detected if the team size of any candidate team
significantly increases. This is likely to happen when, for instance, a leader of an organized
crime is trying to recruit a team. In the second scenario, an outbreak is detected when the
number of interactions within any candidate team significantly increases. This can occur in
two ways: (i) when individuals within the same team interact more with individuals outside
of their current group, or (ii) members of the group interact significantly more frequently
among themselves. Combinations of (i) and (ii) may also flag communication outbreaks.
5 Simulation Study
We now access the utility of our proposed surveillance plans on a test bed of simulated
networks. We consider two types of communication outbreaks among small target teams. In
the first scenario, we simulate a collaborative team outbreak, where every actor in a small and
unknown team is involved in the outbreak. In the second scenario, the target team has an
unknown dominant leader whose communication levels with the remaining team undergoes
an outbreak. For each of these cases, we investigate the effectiveness of the GEWMA and
14
DEWMA strategies.
For each simulation, we generate 100 in-control networks followed by 500 networks that
have undergone an outbreak. We record the time to signal - the number of networks after
the change until a signal is flagged - of the DEWMA and GEWMA plans and repeat the
experiment 10000 times for the collaborative team outbreak and 1000 times for the dominant
leader outbreak. To evaluate the performance of a plan, we record the average time to signal
(ATS) over the collection of simulations. We present the results for all simulations in Tables
1 - 12 in the Appendix.
5.1 Collaborative Team Outbreaks
Tables 1 through 10 outline the detection properties of simulated collaborative team
outbreaks for networks of size n = 100. To simulate an outbreak, we select a fixed but hidden
team Ω ⊆ {1, . . . , 100}. In the first 100 in-control networks, communication counts among
the nodes in Ω have mean λ. In the remaining networks, the nodes in Ω have an increased
mean communication count of (1 + δ)λ. We simulate networks with target teams of size
nΩ = 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. For each time series of networks, we estimate candidate collaborative
teams and dominant leader teams via (17) and (19) and then apply the GEWMA and
DEWMA plans from (5) and (11), respectively.
5.1.1 The GEWMAt Plan
In the first part of our study, we simulate homogeneous target networks with mean
communication counts of either λ = 0.20 or 0.70. We investigate significance thresholds k
between 0.05 and 0.40 in increments of 0.05. Table 1 explores changes in communication
counts in a team of size 6. Table 1 reveals that k = 0.40 provides the best performance for
both λ values.
We extend the first simulation to seek the best plan for detecting the collaborative team
Ω, when nΩ = 6 and n = 100. We investigate significance thresholds of k between 0.40
and 0.70 for expected communication rates of λ = 0.20, 0.40 and 0.70. Together, Tables
1 and 2 indicate that k = 0.60 is the best choice for all λ and Ω involving 6 of the 100
actors. Furthermore we find that the performance of the GEWMA plan strongly depends on
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an appropriate choice of k; the detection performance of the GEWMA plan is dramatically
improved for k = 0.60.
We repeat the collaborative team outbreak simulation for a target team of size 7, 8,
9, and 10. In each simulation, we seek the best significance threshold k for homogeneous
networks with mean communication λ = 0.20, 0.40 and 0.70. We report the ATS over 10000
simulations for each of these settings in Tables 3 - 6. Our results suggest that k = 0.50 is
the best choice for all λ when nΩ is 8, 9, or 10, while k = 0.50 or 0.60 is most suitable for
networks where the target team is of size 7. This result suggests that there is an inverse
relationship between the optimal value of k and the size of the target team. This is helpful
in deciding the choice of k for the GEWMA plan, and it appears that k = 0.50 is a robust
choice for the outbreaks considered in this study.
5.1.2 The DEWMAν,t Plan
Tables 7 - 10 report the results of the DEWMA surveillance plan on the collaborative
team outbreaks described above for target teams of size 6, 7, 8, and 9. For each setting,
k = 0.45 tends to be the best choice for significance threshold. The only exception is in
the case that the team is of size 9 and the mean communication is λ = 0.70, in which case
k = 0.40 is the better choice.
5.1.3 Comparison of the GEWMAt and DEWMAν,t Plans
In comparing the results for the GEWMA and DEWMA plans on the collaborative team
outbreak simulation, we find that in general the GEWMA plan outperforms the DEWMA
plan. In particular, the GEWMA strategy detects the collaborative team sooner than its
counterpart. For example when δ = 1 and λ = 0.2, the strategy based on GEWMAt in
Table 2 had an ATS equal to 11.62 (k = 0.60) whereas the technology based on DEWMAν,t
in Table 7 had an ATS equal to 12.90 (k = 0.45). Similarly, when δ = 0.50 and λ = 0.70;
the GEWMAt strategy had an ATS equal to 8.54 (k = 0.50); whereas, the DEWMAν,t plan
had an ATS of 8.87 (k = 0.40).
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5.1.4 Is the Methodology fit-for-purpose?
In order to judge whether the technology is fit for purpose we consider the monitoring of
a crime. To be effective, we would like our strategy to flag the planning of a crime within
seven days. We assume the following specifications of team behavior:
1. In order to plan a crime, team members should call each other at least 0.5 per day
during the planning phase. We consider this to be the lowest level of communication
necessary to plan a crime.
2. The planning stage of the crime would result in at least a doubling of their usual
communication intensity during this planning stage.
3. The usefulness specification is that detection should be well within 7 days of the start
(i.e., the out-of-control ATS < 7).
The last specification allows law enforcement agencies enough time for appropriate de-
tective work to be carried out and potentially avoid catastrophic events such as terrorism.
The optimal plan for λ = 0.4 and 0.7 pass the usefulness test by flagging within seven days
on average for all groups (e.g., with λ = 0.4, k = 0.6 the GEWMAt statistics detect the out-
break on average in 6.93 days). On the other hand, when the overall communication in the
network is relatively sparse (λ = 0.2), this fit for purpose test is only met for collaborative
teams having 8 or more members.
5.2 Dominant Leader Team Outbreaks
We now investigate the performance of the GEWMA and DEWMA plans when the out-
break occurs among a fixed but unknown dominant leader team in a homogeneous dynamic
network. We simulate the networks with the same specifications as the collaborative team
study in Section 5.1, except now the outbreak only occurs on a fixed subset of communi-
cations in the team (rather than throughout the entire team as in the collaborative team
scenario). In particular, we consider four different dominant leader teams where a commu-
nication outbreak occurs on the directed edges shown in Figure 5.2. In each of these four
teams, team member 6 is assumed to be the dominant leader and communicates with all
other members of the team.
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Figure 1: Dominant leader target teams for the simulation study. Teams are of size 6, 7, 8,
and 9 among a network of size 100. For each simulation, a communication outbreak occurs
only on the directed edges shown. In each simulation, node 6 is the dominant leader and
communicates with every member of the team.
We assess the performance of the GEWMA and DEWMA plans on these dominant leader
outbreaks and report the results in Tables 11 and 12. Our results suggest that again the
choice of k plays an important role in establishing the best performing monitoring strategy.
Furthermore, across all values of λ k, and nΩ, we found that the DEWMA method out-
performed the GEWMA strategy in this simulation study. Both methods witness improved
performance as the signal to noise ratio (δ) increases. Our results provide empirical evidence
that the DEWMA plan is an effective strategy when the target team has a dominant leader,
or when the team is more sparsely connected than a collaborative team.
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5.3 Heterogeneous Networks with no Outbreak
We now assess the performance of the ADEWMA plan from (26) on heterogeneous
networks that undergo no outbreak, but whose size changes through time. Without loss
of generality, we fix the mean communication count between node i and j at time t as
λi,j,t = a|i− j|+ 0.90, for a fixed constant a < 0. This specification gives a higher likelihood
of communication between nodes that are close to one another in the ordering of the nodes.
To vary the size of the network through time, we fix lower (mL) and upper bounds (mH) and
select the size of the tth network nt by randomly drawing a discrete value uniformly from
the interval [mL,mH ].
As there is no outbreak in our simulated collection of networks, we seek a plan that
identifies no change for some fixed number of time steps. By investigating this aspect of the
ADEWMA plan, we can better understand how to control the number of false discoveries un-
der a null model where no outbreak is present. For our current study, we seek an ADEWMA
plan that delivers an ATS of 100. We note that one could alternatively seek an ATS of 370
to match the standard three sigma strategy of Shewhart control charts, but the choice is
arbitrary. We vary the values of a, mL, and mH and identify the threhold adjustment that
acquires the desired ATS over 1000 simulations. The threshold adjustments and calculated
ATS are provided in Table 13.
The simulation results in Table 13 reveal that the ADEWMA plan with threshold 0.984
has an in-control ATS closest to the desired value of 100 when mH > 135. On the other
hand, when mH ≤ 135 selecting a threshold of 1 delivers the best plan. These results suggest
that the ADEWMA plan is robust to large changes in the size of the network from one time
to the next. In many applications (like our application in Section 6), the size nt is likely
to have a small variation over time. We find that in these situations the ADEWMA plan
witnesses an improvement in overall robustness.
6 Application to U.S. Congressional Voting
We now apply the GEWMA monitoring plan from (6) to investigate the dynamic rela-
tionship between Republican and Democratic senators in the U.S. Congress. We analyze the
voting habits of each U.S. senator according to his or her vote (yay, nay, or abstain) on each
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bill that went to Congress. We investigate these voting habits from 1857 (Congress 35) to
2015 (Congress 113).
We generated a dynamic network to model the co-voting patterns among U.S. Senators
in the following manner. We first collected the raw roll call voting data for each bill from
http://voteview.com. For each Congress, we generate a new network, where the senators
of that Congress are the nodes, and the edge weight between two senators is the number
of bills for which those two senators voted concurrently in that Congress. We restrict our
analysis to Republican and Democrat senators only (thus ignoring the Independent party
and other affiliations).
Predictable behavior is regarded as in-control. To model in-control behavior, we use
a logistic regression model to predict whether two senators will vote the same on a newly
submitted bill. We fit a logistic model to estimate the probability that a senator (Senator A)
would vote the same as another senator (Senator B) using the following predictors: (a) the
political affiliation of each senator (Senators A and B), (b) which party had a majority in
the Congress, (c) the proportion of that majority, and (d) the proportion of representation
of Senator A’s political affiliation. The expected number of votes from Senator A to Senator
B was calculated by multiplying the predicted probability from the logistic regression by the
total number of votes for that senator. This count was assumed to be Poisson distributed
with in-control mean given by this expected count.
In this application we are interested in both unusually high counts and unusually low
counts. Therefore we run two one-sided charts. In particular, for a target team Ωt we analyze
the GEWMAt statistic from (4), as well as the lower GEWMA (L-GEWMAt) statistic defined
by
L-GEWMAt = min(α
∑
i∈Ωt
∑
j∈Ωt
y˜i,j,t + (1− α) L-GEWMAt−1, µΩt),
where α was fixed to be 0.075. The plans are trained using simulation to deliver an in-
control false alarm rate of 200. The GEWMA and L-GEWMA curves were calculated from
two sources (i) the likelihood of Republicans voting with Democrats, and (ii) the likelihood of
Democrats voting with Republicans. We do not expect our co-voting patterns to remain in-
control and predictable; thus, we are particularly interested in identifying sustained periods
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of unusual behavior.
The GEWMA and L-GEWMA curves are plotted in Figure 7. These plots reveal several
interesting trends in the Congressional co-voting network. First, the tendency for Republican
and Democratic senators to vote with one another has been significantly low beginning from
Congress 103. This finding supports the political polarization theory observed in Moody and
Mucha (2013), who noted that the Republican and Democrat schism began around the time
of Bill Clinton’s first term as president (Congress 103). Second, there was a sustained coher-
ence of voting between opposing political parties between Congress 85 (1957) and Congress
100 (1987). During this time, the likelihood of one party concurrently voting with the other
opposing party was significantly high. Much of this time period coincides with the so-called
“Rockefeller Republican” era (1960 - 1980) in which Republican party members were known
to hold particularly moderate views like the former governor of New York, Nelson Rocke-
feller (Rae, 1989; Smith, 2014). This finding was also identified using network surveillance
techniques in Wilson et al. (2016).
7 Discussion
This paper introduces novel and computationally feasible surveillance plans for identi-
fying communication outbreaks in dynamic networks. In the worst-case scenario when the
target team is unknown, the proposed method monitors at most n2 candidate teams, which
dramatically improves the computational memory needed for an exhaustive search. Our new
plan uses a general multivariate EWMA approach to accumulate temporal memory of com-
munication counts. The approach can easily be extended to situtations with more than one
communication channel. Plans were extended to handle networks with heterogeneous mean
counts (as in the application) and the value of our proposed plans was further demonstrated
with simulated applications.
In our simulation study, we found that our new approach is able to effectively identify
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Figure 2: GEWMA and L-GEWMA control charts for monitoring (TOP): the likelihood of
Democratic senators to vote with Republican senators, and (BOTTOM): the likelihood of
Republican senators to vote with Democratic senators. Red dotted lines mark the control
limits of the GEWMA signal to noise value for each Congress. In each plot, the upper curve
represents the GEWMA statistic and the lower curve represents the L-GEWMA statistic
over time.
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outbreaks even when the outbreak covers a small number of communications (< 1% of total
communications). These results suggest that the technology will be particularly useful in
crime management as crime is typically committed by gangs of a small size (A Morgan and
W Shelley, 2014). Furthermore, we believe that law enforcement agencies would value our
proposed technique as it could be used to help gain insights on persons of interest, e.g., it
could be applied juvenile crime rings as a preventative tool to help reduce repeat offenders.
We found that when the outbreak is global across all communications of the targeted
people, using the TEWMAt plan is the best approach and this plan is invariant of the
distribution of communication counts in the target network. If the communication outbreaks
involves a small sub-group of the targeted people then the group-EWMA (GEWMAt) plan
has best performance. As the size of the outbreak group is seldom known in advance, applying
these plans simultaneously in a single plan may offer a more robust means to detect the full
range of potential outbreaks.
Our proposed technique motivates several areas of future research. For example, future
work should explore the potential of extending this approach to cover geographic dimensions
(see Carley et al. (2013)) to account for the spatial nature of observed dynamic systems.
Furthermore, one can explore other ways of estimating the target team for monitoring.
New approaches could involve defining people in the targeted network with either increased
connectivity or historically a high connectivity. The target group itself could be regarded as
varying according to whether they achieve a certain level of connectivity with the leaders,
or average connectivity within the target group. In principle, one could also estimate teams
of individuals that are most densely connected at time t using a community detection or
extraction algorithm on the network Yt (Lancichinetti et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011; Wilson
et al., 2014). Alternatively, one could identify candidate teams in a network with statistically
significant edges using a p-value technique like that developed in Wilson et al. (2013).
Finally, this paper arbitrarily selected the temporal smoothing parameter α = 0.075.
Therefore future research effort could be devoted to selecting an appropriate value for the
multivariate temporal smoothing. We believe that this effort should be devoted either to
establishing an appropriate robust choice for α, or to alternatively varying the choice of α
for each communication count so as to exploit local trends in the network such as the work
done in Capizzi and Masarotto (2003).
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Appendix
Specification of Threshold Values
Simulation methods were used to estimate the thresholds for the DEWMAν,t and GEWMAt
plans so as to deliver an in-control ATS of approximately 100. The thresholds for both the
collaborative team and the dominant leader team were established in the identical manner.
To avoid redundancy, we will describe the simulation procedure to determine thresholds in
the collaborative team scenario.
For the DEWMAν,t plan, we simulated networks of size n = 100, 125, 150, . . . , 375, 400.
For each network, we fixed the temporal memory as α = 0.10 and generated homogeneous
networks with mean counts equal to λ = 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, . . . , 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, . . . , 0.95, 1.0.
For each combination, the thresholds hD(λ, n) are estimated to obtain the fixed ATS. These
values were then used to build the following regression model:
log(hD(λ, n)) = β0 + β1n+ β2n2 + β3n3 + β4λ+ β5λ2 + β6 I(λ < 0.95) + β7 I(λ < 0.95)λ
+ β8 log(λ) + β9n log(λ) + β10nλ+ β11nλ2 + error.
Once fitted, the above regression model was used to estimate the thresholds for the
DEWMAν,t plan for homogeneous networks with mean count λ and size n. The above
fitted model delivers an in-control ATS within 100 ± 15 for the range of 100 ≤ n ≤ 400,
0.01 ≤ λ ≤ 1.0 and α = 0.10. The standard error of the model was 0.0043 and the correlation
between the model fitted values and the corresponding actual simulated hD(λ, n) values was
0.9996.
For the GEWMAt plan, we estimated the threshold hG(λ, n) in a similar way as above.
We generated networks of size n = 100, 125, 150, . . . , 975, 1000, fixed α = 0.10, and simulated
homogeneous networks with mean counts λ = 0.01, 0.02, 0.3, . . . , 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, . . . , 0.95, 1.0.
For each combination, we estimated the threshold hG(λ, n) through simulation, and then
used these estimates to build the following regression model:
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1/hG(λ,m) = β0 + β1 log(λ) + β2n+ β3n2 + β4n3 + β5λ+ β6λ2 + β7λ3 + β8 log(n) + β9 log(λ)n
+ β10 log(λ)n2 + β11 log(λ)n3 + β12nλ+ β13n2λ+ β14n3λ+ β15λ4 + β15λ log(n)
+ β16λ5 + β17λ2 log(n) + β18λ3 log(n) + error
The above model estimates the thresholds for the GEWMAt for homogeneous counts and
obtained an in-control ATS of 100± 7 for 100 ≤ n ≤ 1000, 0.01 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and α = 0.10. The
standard error of the model was 0.0007 and the correlation between the model fitted values
and the corresponding actual simulated hD(λ) values was 0.99999.
Simulation Study Results
Below, we provide tables for the simulation results described in Section 5.
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